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PROCEDURAL ISSUES RAISED BY GUIDELINES
SENTENCING: THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE "ELEMENTS OF THE SENTENCE"
SARA SUN BEALE*
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") the
sentencing range applicable to each defendant is the product of
numerous factual findings. After determining the base level for the
offense of conviction, the sentencing judge is required to make
findings on a long list of factual issues, such as the quantity of
drugs involved m a transaction,1 and the level of the defendant's
participation.2 Each factual determination has a prescribed effect
on the offense level. For example, a finding that the defendant was
the organizer or leader of criminal activity involving five or more
participants requires a four-level increase, while a finding that the
defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not the organizer or
leader) of the same group requires only a three-level increase.3 If
the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in 'a
group in which less than five persons were involved, the Guidelines
dictate a two-level increase. 4
Although some factual issues with a significant impact on Guide-
lines sentencing are resolved at the guilt-innocence phase, many
other facts crucial to the calculation of a Guidelines sentence will
not be resolved by the jury's verdict or a guilty plea because they
are not elements of the offense.
Under the Guidelines regime, what procedural protections are
applicable to critical findings made at the sentencing phase? Does
a defendant have a constitutional right under either the Sixth
Amendment or the Due Process Clause to full confrontation and
cross-examination in connection with findings that increase the ap-
* Professor of Law, Duke Umversity. B.A. (1971) and J.D. (1974), the University of
Michigan.
1. U.S.S.G. § 2DI.1(c) (1993).
2. Id. § 3Bi.1 (distinguishing major, minor; and minimal participants).
3. Id. § 3Bl.1(a)-(b).
4. Id. § 3Bi.l(c).
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plicable Guidelines range? Should the Federal Rules of Evidence
apply at sentencing hearings? Should the defendant have a right to
have factual findings made by a jury9 What standard of proof ap-
plies to such determinations-proof beyond a reasonable doubt, by
a preponderance of the evidence, or some intermediate standard,
such as clear and convincing evidence?
The Guidelines cast some light on the Sentencing Commission's
thinking on these issues. The Guidelines provide that "the parties
shall be given an adequate opportunity to present information to
the court" regarding disputed issues, and that "the court may con-
sider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under
the rules of evidence at trial, provided that the information has
sufficient indicia to support its probable accuracy "I The Guide-
lines' commentary explains that reliable hearsay, including state-
ments of unidentified informants, may be considered.6 The Com-
mission, however, expressly declined to determine the applicable
standard of proof."
A brief description of three cases gives a sense of the importance
of these procedural issues. In United States v. Wise,' the defend-
ant pled guilty to counterfeiting. Upon finding that Wise was the
leader or organizer of criminal activity including five or more par-
ticipants, the trial court increased his Guidelines offense level by
four levels, resulting in an additional sentence of twelve months.'
Wise's plea agreement made no reference to the participation of
other individuals. The only evidence of the defendant's leadership
role and of the participation of five other persons was the testi-
mony of the probation officer who had prepared the pre-sentencing
report.1" The officer admittedly had no personal knowledge of any
facts surrounding the offense, nor had he spoken to any of the in-
dividuals allegedly involved with Wise." Instead, the witness' in-
5. Id. § 6A1.3(a) (policy statement); see also FED. R. EvID. 1101(d)(3) (stating that the
Federal Rules of Evidence are not applicable at sentencing).
6. U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 cmt. (1993).
7. Supplementary Report on the Initial Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements
47 n.79 (1987), quoted in United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 655 (9th Cir. 1991) (en
banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1564 (1992).
8. 976 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1592 (1993).
9. Id. at 404.
10. Id. at 396.
11. Id.
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formation came from a variety of government sources, including
conversations with various unnamed persons in the federal pre-
trial diversion services, the state prosecutor's office, the Secret Ser-
vice, and the U.S. Attorney's Office. 12 On appeal, Chief Judge Ar-
nold described the nature of the evidence before the district court:
Wise has served an additional 12 months in a federal peniten-
tiary because a witness with no personal knowledge says that a
Secret Service file, or some unnamed person in a state prosecu-
tor's office, says that Earl Dean Laughlin, who is not in court,
says that Wise was involved with him in the offense and was its
leader or organizer. This is double or triple hearsay at best. We
do not know exactly even what Laughlin said, or what anyone
who ever talked directly to hin says he said.'
United States v. Restrepo4 illustrates a second facet of the
problems that exist under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Restrepo was tried and found guilty of selling 37.5 grams of co-
caine. His co-defendant pled guilty to two additional sales involv-
ing sixty-five grams of cocaine.is At Restrepo's sentencing hearing,
the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that
Restrepo too had participated in these additional sales.'" This sen-
tencing finding triggered an automatic increase in Restrepo's
Gidelines range from twenty-seven to thirty-three months to
forty-one to fifty-one months. 7 Restrepo illustrates that the
Guidelines definition of "relevant conduct""' often reaches beyond
the time and place of the offense of conviction, and often includes
12. Id.
13. Id. at 406 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting).
14. 946 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1564 (1992).
15. United States v. Restrepo, 903 F.2d 648, 650 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1990).
16. Id. at 650.
17. Id. at 650 & n.2 (discussing the specific sentencing calculations, based upon both the
amount of drugs and the conclusion that Restrepo was the leader of a drug-dealing ring in
which his co-defendant participated).
18. The Guidelines define "relevant conduct" as:
(a)(1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, com-
manded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and (B) in
the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity all reasonably foresee-
able acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity that occurred during the commission of the offense of convic-
tion, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid
detection or responsibility forthat offense;
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conduct for which separate criminal charges could have been
filed.19 This is particularly true in the case of drug offenses, where
the definition of relevant conduct includes all conduct that was
"part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as
the offense of conviction."20
To date, the largest reported departure from an applicable
Guidelines range on the basis of facts adduced at the sentencing
hearing came in United States v. Kikumura.2' The Guidelines sen-
tence for Kikumura's offense of conviction was twenty-seven to
thirty-three months imprisonment. 22 The district judge increased
the defendant's sentence twelve-fold, to thirty years imprisonment,
based on his finding by a preponderance of the evidence that
Kikumura was a member of the Japanese Red Army and that he
was planning a terrorist mission in the United States.23 The evi-
dence that Kikumura was an international terrorist was presented
in the form of two affidavits, one from a Dutch police officer and
the other from an FBI agent who detailed his conversations with
an unidentified confidential informant.24
How have the lower courts resolved the issues raised in cases
such as Wise, Restrepo, and Kikumura9 Although these issues
have provoked serious divisions in the courts-leading to en banc
review in both Wise and Restrepo-each of the sentences has been
upheld. Though courts have tended to analyze the Confrontation
(2) solely with respect to offense of a character for which § 3D1.2(d) would
require grouping of all multiple counts, all acts and omissions described in
Subdivisions (1)(A) and (1)(B) above that were part of the same course of con-
duct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction;
(3) All harm that resulted from the acts and omissions specified in subsec-
tions (c)(1) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the object of such acts and
omissions, and
(4) any other information specified in the applicable guideline.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a).
19. Id. § 1B1.3 cmt. 1, 2.
20. Id. § 1B1.3(a)(2); see also United States v. Hahn, 960 F.2d 903, 909-11 (9th Cir. 1992)
(discussing the factors courts should consider in determining whether to include conduct
outside the immediate time frame of the offense of conviction).
21. 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990).
22. Id. at 1089.
23. Id. at 1097.
24. Id. at 1096-97.
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Clause and the standard of proof separately, 5 the bottom line has
been the same: Courts have drawn a sharp distinction between the
procedural protections available in the guilt-innocence phase of the
trial and those applicable to sentencing under the Guidelines. At
sentencing, courts generally have endorsed the use of evidence that
is not subject to confrontation and does not satisfy the Federal
Rules of Evidence as long as the evidence meets minimal standards
of reliability 28 The courts generally have applied the preponder-
ance standard to the use of such evidence.
The cases reflect the influence of Supreme Court precedents
dealing with the Confrontation Clause and standard of proof, and
a more general "judgment that a convicted criminal is entitled to
less process than a presumptively innocent criminal defendant,
as well as the concern that 'over-burdened trial courts would
be greatly disserved by the time-consuming hearings' that more in-
tensive procedural protections would require."2 Though following
this trend, Kikumura held that in extreme cases-such as the
thirty-year sentence increase in that case-an intermediate stan-
dard of clear and convincing proof and reasonably trustworthy evi-
dence should apply 29 Subsequent decisions have distinguished
Kikumura, requiring only a minimal showing of reliability to admit
hearsay evidence not subject to confrontation and applying the
preponderance standard.30
After briefly reviewing the two lines of analysis that have domi-
nated in the lower courts, I will suggest an overlooked line of
thought.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1592 (1993).
26. Id. at 397.
27. Id. at 400.
28. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1100 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Lee, 818
F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956 (1987)).
29. Id. at 1102-03.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Kwong-Wah, 966 F.2d 682 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
287 (1992); United States v. Trujillo, 959 F.2d 1377 (7th Cir.), cert. dented, 113 S. Ct. 287
(1992); United States v. Schuster, 948 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1991).
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A. Confrontation Rights at Sentencing3 '
In general, the lower courts have continued to follow "[t]he long
established principle , both before and after adoption of the
guidelines, that the constitutional protections afforded de-
fendants at a criminal trial, including confrontation rights, are not
available at sentencing proceedings to limit the court's considera-
tion of the background, character and conduct of the defendant." 2
The seminal decision on confrontation rights at sentencing is the
Supreme Court's pre-Guidelines ruling in Williams v. New York.3
Because Williams was decided before the Confrontation Clause
was held applicable to state proceedings, the Court applied the
Due Process Clause.34 Williams held that the sentencing court did
not deny due process by considering evidence from the pre-sen-
tence report that the defendant had no opportunity to rebut.35
Under Williams, once the narrow issue of guilt or innocence has
been resolved, the sentencing judge should be free to consider "the
fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and
characteristics" in order to determine the proper type and extent
of punishment.36 The Court concluded that, given the function of
the sentencing determination, saddling the sentencing process with
the requirements of full confrontation and cross-examination was
neither necessary nor appropriate:
We must recognize that most of the information now relied upon
by judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of
sentences would be unavailable if information were restricted to
that given in open court by witnesses subject to cross-examina-
tion. And the modern probation report draws on information
concerning every aspect of a defendant's life. The type and ex-
tent of this information make totally impractical if not impossi-
ble open court testimony with cross-examination. Such a proce-
31. For a more extended discussion of confrontation rights at sentencing, see David A.
Hoffman, Note, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Confrontation Rights, 42 DUKE
L.J. 382 (1992), and Note, An Argument for Confrontation Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1880 (1992).
32. United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1511 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
33. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
34. Id. at 245.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 247.
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ing, and that the new federal sentencing regime requires confronta-
tion.46 The right to confrontation at sentencing may be grounded
in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.47 Alterna-
tively, some have suggested that the Mathews v. Eldndge48 balanc-
ing test for due process 49 requires confrontation at sentencing to
avoid erroneous determinations resulting in added periods of incar-
ceration under the Guidelines regime. 50
B. The Standard of Proof at Sentencng51
Although the standard of proof. issue has provoked a sharp de-
bate, the lower courts generally have concluded that Guidelines
findings need be established only by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, not by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.52 Some courts,
however, have agreed (at least in dicta) that extreme cases might
require an intermediate standard, such as the clear and convincing
standard applied in Kikumura.53
46. United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1373 (9th Cir. 1993) (Noonan, J., dissenting);
Wise, 976 F.2d at 408-09 (Arnold, C.J., concurring m part and dissenting in part).
47. The Confrontation Clause states: "[The accused shall enjoy the right] to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
48. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
49. Mathews requires the balancing of three factors: the private interest at stake, the
government's interest (including the cost of additional procedural safeguards), and the in-
cremental improvement m accuracy. Id. at 335.
50. See Wise, 976 F.2d at 411 (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(concluding that Mathews requires confrontation); Hoffman, supra note 31; Note, An Argu-
ment for Confrontation, supra note 31.
51. For other articles discussing the standard of proof applicable to Guidelines sentenc-
ing, see David N. Adair, House Built on a Weak Foundation-Sentencing Guidelines and
the Preponderance Standard, 4 FED. SENr. REP. 292 (1992); Judy Clarke, The Need for a
Higher Burden of Proof for Factfinding Under the Guidelines, 4 FED. SENT. REP. 300 (1992);
Richard Husseini, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Adopting Clear and Convincing Ev-
idence as the Burden of Proof, 57 U. CHL L. REv. 1387 (1990); Steven N. Salkey & Blair G.
Brown, The Preponderance of Evidence Standard at Sentencing, 4 AM. CRIm. L. REv. 907
(1992).
52. E.g., United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1124-25 (11th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Sleet, 893 F.2d 947, 949 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Guerra, 888 F.2d
247 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990).
53. E.g., United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1100-01 (3d Cir. 1990); see also
Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d at 1125 (indicating that the court in the future or in a different
context may require a lgher standard of proof than a preponderance of the evidence).
154 [Vol. 35:147
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dure could endlessly delay criminal administration in a retrial of
collateral issues. 3
The lower federal courts generally have concluded that the sharp
distinction between conviction and sentence still exists under the
Guidelines regime and justifies the admission at sentencing of evi-
dence not tested by full confrontation." As a majority of the Sixth
Circuit concluded in an en banc decision, "[w]hile a number of
considerations have changed, we are of the view that the permis-
sible methods of informing the sentencing judge and the need for
information in fashioning sentences in light of the constitutional
rights of defendants at sentencing have not essentially changed.""9
The courts have recognized, however, that due process requires
that hearsay evidence demonstrate "some minimal indicia of
reliability "40
These decisions have provoked vigorous dissents arguing that
the Guidelines have so revolutionized federal sentencing that pre-
Guidelines precedents no longer apply 41 Williams held that con-
frontation was not essential in a discretionary system where the
sentence resulted from the judge's subjective assessment of the de-
fendant's rehabilitative potential.42 This conclusion does not carry
over to Guidelines sentencing, which rejects the discretionary
model of individualized sentencing.43 Guidelines sentencing is now
"a thoroughly fact-driven process, ' 44 in which the sentence results
from numerous findings regarding the nature of the offense and
not from the judge's subjective assessments of the defendant's
character and rehabilitative potential.45 Accordingly, the dissenters
have argued that Williams has no bearing on Guidelines sentenc-
37. Id. at 250 (footnote omitted).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1367-69 (9th Cir. 1993) (collecting
cases from seven circuits).
39. United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1508 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
40. Petty, 982 F.2d at 1369. Most courts permit consideration of extrinsic corroborating
evidence to demonstrate the requisite reliability. Id.
41. See, e.g., id. at 1370 (Noonan, J., dissenting); United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 405
(8th Cir. 1992) (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1592 (1993).
42. Wise, 976 F.2d at 399-400.
43. See id. at 400.
44. Note, An Argument for Confrontation, supra note 31, at 1881.
45. Id.
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The principal authority for the application of the preponderance
standard at sentencing is McMillan v. Pennsylvania. In McMil-
lan the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state sen-
tencing scheme that imposed a five-year minimum sentence when
it was found by a preponderance of the evidence that thedefend-
ant visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of certain
enumerated felonies.55 Although the Due Process Clause requires
"'the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged,' ",56
the Court concluded that this stringent standard was not applica-
ble to the state sentencing statute. Under the state statute, posses-
sion of a firearm was not an element of the crime, but rather "a
sentencing factor that comes into play only after the defendant has
been found guilty of one of [the enumerated] crimes beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. '57 While recognizing that under some circum-
stances the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt might
apply to facts not identified formally as elements of the offense
charged, 58 the Court noted the absence in the case before it of the
kinds of factors that might require a higher standard of proof.5 9
The Court observed that the mandatory five-year, term operated
only to limit the court's discretion in selecting the penalty from
within the applicable range, not to increase the maximum punish-
ment nor to define a separate offense.60 The Court also concluded
that the statute gave no hint of having been tailored to ensure that
the sentencing factors were the "tail which wags the dog," i.e., col-
lateral factors that were permitted to determine the outcome. 1 Fi-
nally, the Court observed that there was no indication that Penn-
sylvania was trying to evade the requirements of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt by defining possession as a sentencing factor
rather than an element of the offense.2 Under those circum-
54. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
55. Id. at 85-87.
56. Id. at 84 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 86.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 87-88.
61. Id. at 88.
62. Id. at 89.
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stances, the Court found no due process bar to the use of the pre-
ponderance standard.63
Both courts and commentators have debated the applicability of
the McMillan analysis to Guidelines sentencing. In general, the
lower courts have concluded that McMillan permits the use of the
preponderance standard because the Guidelines, like the statute in
McMillan, merely determine the appropriate sentence within the
statutory range. 4 In the view of these courts, the Guidelines
neither evade the constitutional proof requirements, nor permit
the tail to wag the dog.
A few dissenting judges, and some commentators, have taken
quite a different view of Guidelines sentencing.0 5 In their view,
findings under the Guidelines do not simply guide a court m se-
lecting a sentence within the applicable range, as in McMillan.6
Instead, the Guidelines restrict the sentencer's discretion to a nar-
row sentencing range based upon the offense of conviction and the
defendant's criminal record. 7 Once the sentencer has identified
the base offense and calculated the defendant's criminal history
score, the Guidelines prescribe a narrow sentencing range (e.g.,
twenty-seven to thirty-three months in Restrepo's case),. s Thus, in
a real sense, sentencing findings (such as the finding linking
Restrepo to sixty-five grams of cocaine) do increase the defend-
ant's sentence over that otherwise provided by law Critics charge
that the Guidelines' structure does indeed permit the "tail" of con-
duct, proved only by a preponderance, to "wag the dog" of the con-
duct charged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial. 9 By increasing the defendant's sentence on the ba-
sis of distinct offenses with which he was neither charged nor con-
victed, ° such as the two additional cocaine sales in Restrepo, the
63. Id. at 91-93.
64. See United States v. Masters, 978 F.2d 281, 286-87 (7th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2333 (1993); United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1991)
(en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1564 (1992).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1533 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(Martin, J., dissenting); Restrepo, 946 F.2d at 664 (Norris, J., dissenting).
66. Restrepo, 946 F.2d at 669-72 (Norris, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 674.
68. Id. at 664, 671.
69. Id. at 664.
70. Id.
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Guidelines also permit the prosecutor to evade the constitutional
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Even if proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required, the due
process balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge suggests that at
least clear and convincing evidence .is required to extend the length
of the defendant's Guidelines sentence.71
C. Another View-Looking At the Bottom Line
The lower courts understandably have turned to the Supreme
Court precedents that seem to be most on point: Williams and Mc-
Millan. As a second tier of analysis, courts and commentators have
considered the effects of the general due process balancing test of
Mathews v. Eldridge.7
2
These narrow lines of analysis have obscured the big picture, or
perhaps more accurately, the bottom line.78 In fact, the bottom line
is quite astonishing. As a result of the sharp distinction between
the guilt-innocence phase and the sentencing phase, federal crimi-
nal defendants now have far less protection at the sentencing stage
than civil defendants who contest damages once liability has been
determined. Procedural protections regarded as essential to the de-
termination of the amount of damages in a civil proceeding, such
as the application of the rules of evidence, and particularly the op-
portunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, cannot
be deemed unnecessary when courts determine the appropriate
sentence for a defendant whose criminal liability has been
established.
The absence of procedural protections may well have been rea-
sonable when sentencing was not a truly legal decision. In a discre-
tionary sentencing scheme dominated by at least a rhetoric of re-
habilitation, the sentence was not a product of any findings of fact
about the nature of the offense, but rather a product of the judge's
intuition about the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation. 4 The
71. Husseim, supra note 51, at 1407.
72. See, e.g., Restrepo, 946 F.2d at 665 (Norris, J., dissenting).
73. For an excellent critque of the effects of bifurcating fact finding regarding offense-
related conduct, see Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated
Factfinding Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S.
CAL. L. REv. 289 (1992).
74. William v. New York, 377 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1949).
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rhetoric of the rehabilitative ideal also led courts to characterize
the proceedings as non-adversarial.75 While the reality did not live
up to this vision, the vision nonetheless played an important role
in shaping the Williams ruling.7 6
The current situation is quite different. Under the fact-driven
and legalistic Guidelines system, findings on a series of issues lead
to prescribed increases in the applicable sentencing range. The
sentencing elements have the same determinant effect on an indi-
vidual sentence as do the facts proven in the damages phase of a
civil trial.77
Consider in this connection the relationship between the issues
discussed here and those before the Supreme Court in Patterson v.
New York. 8 Patterson upheld a New York statute requiring the
defendant to bear the burden of proving that he acted under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional distress. 79 A bare major-
ity of the Court distinguished an earlier decision which had held
that requiring the defendant to prove that he had acted in the heat
of passion violated the due process requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.80 Patterson held that the crucial distinction was
formal: New York not only had shifted the burden of persuasion to
the defendant, but also had defined "extreme emotional distress"
as a defense, not a negation of one of the elements of the offense of
murder.8 1
Despite the sharp division it provoked on the Court and the con-
siderable academic commentary it generated,82 the decision in Pat-
terson actually disadvantaged defendants far less than the current
Guidelines regime. Though Patterson required the defendant to
bear the burden of persuasion on a mitigating defense,8 3 the de-
fendant was still entitled to have the issue of his mental distress
75. Id. at 249.
76. Id. at 246-51.
77. United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 664 (9th Cir. 1991) (Pregerson, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1564 (1992).
78. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
79. Id. at 216.
80. Id. at 200-01, 216 (distinguishing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)).
81. Id. at 206-10.
82. See, e.g., Irene M. Rosenberg, Winship Redux: 1970-1990, 69 TEx. L. Rav. 109, 114
(1990).
83. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207.
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determined by a jury on the basis of legally admissible evidence, 4
and to have full rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and
compulsory process.
The Guidelines have gone a step, or perhaps several steps, fur-
ther. Suppose the Guidelines include the presence or absence of
heat of passion or extreme emotional disturbance as a sentencing
factor. Under the view now prevailing in the lower federal courts, if
these issues are characterized as sentencing factors-rather than as
elements or defenses-there will be no jury trial, no requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, no requirement that the govern-
ment's evidence be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, and no right to full confrontation and cross-examination.
Rather, the evidence need offer only minimal guarantees of trust-
worthiness and meet the preponderance standard.86 As noted
above, the procedural guarantees at sentencing will be far less than
those attending the determination of damages in a garden variety
civil proceeding once civil liability has been determined.
Our present procedures make a lie-of our purported commitment
to a higher standard of procedural fairness in criminal prosecutions
than in civil proceedings. Indeed, the gap between rhetoric and re-
ality is even greater than might appear at first blush since there is
no trial at all in roughly ninety percent of the cases which are dis-
posed of by plea bargain. Thus, in the vast majority of cases, the
only factual findings on contested issues-the findings that. deter-
mine with a degree of mathematical precision the length of the
sentence that the defendant will serve-are made in a process with
standards of procedural fairness insufficient for a civil lawsuit.
My suggested approach, focusing on the bottom line, virtually
compels the conclusion that the procedural safeguards at sentenc-
ing should be no less than those accorded civil litigants. Indeed,
because the fairness and accuracy of the Guidelines regime de-
pends on the reliability of the factual findings supporting the
sentences, the Commission itself should adopt these standards as a
84. Id. at 206.
85. Id.
86. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
87. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., Defendants Disposed in U.S. District Courts, 1991
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 530, table 5.37 (Timothy J. Flanagan & Kath-
leen Maquire eds., 1992) (showing 87% of cases disposed of by guilty plea).
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matter of policy 18 However, since the Commission has not done so,
surely the due process balancing test under Mathews v. Eldridge"9
requires that the protections accorded at a Guidelines sentencing
hearing be no less than those accorded to civil litigants when dam-
ages are calculated after liability has been determined.
Comparison with the civil model suggests an even more dramatic
conclusion. Federal sentencing, like the determination of civil dam-
ages, should be subject to the same procedural rules that attend
the finding of liability or, in this case, guilt. In the criminal con-
text, that rule would entail not only proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, confrontation, and compulsory process, but also trial by
jury at the sentencing stage.
While some arguments may support a unified view of the trial as
including sentencing,"0 I do not advocate that view. In fact, the
text of the Sixth Amendment suggests a distinction between the
"criminal prosecution[]" as a whole and the "trial," which is but
one part of the criminal prosecution. The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory pro-
cess for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defense."'
Though criminal defendants have the right to a jury only at the
trial, courts have held that the Sixth Amendment right to the as-
sistance of counsel applies to the other critical stages of a criminal
88. Cf. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Sentencing Procedures: Where Does the Responsibility
Lie?, 4 FED. SENT. REP. 247 (1992) (arguing that the Commission must address the burden of
proof issue because ineffective procedures can result in erroneous determinations that un-
dermine the social goals the Commission seeks to achieve).
89. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
90. One commentator has suggested that at the time of the drafting of the Sixth Amend-
ment there were no separate sentencing proceedings because criminal statutes generally pro-
vided for mandatory sentences. Note, An Argument for Confrontation, supra note 31, at
1888-89; cf. Herman, supra note 73, 323-37 (arguing that due process should be interpreted
to preclude characterization of offense-related conduct as mere sentencing factor not subject
to all procedure safeguards applicable at trial).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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prosecution.9 2 The treatment of the right to counsel provides an
attractive model for the rights of confrontation and compulsory
process as well. 3 Thus, even if the sentencing proceeding is not
deemed to be part of the trial, the language of the Sixth Amend-
ment suggests that the rights to confrontation and compulsory pro-
cess apply at other critical stages of the criminal prosecution when-
ever witnesses appear for and "against" the defendant. Because
the government may present evidence at sentencing that the de-
fendant was involved in additional criminal offenses, or organized
five or more participants in the crime, Guidelines sentencing
clearly involves the presentation of witnesses against the defend-
ant. Accordingly, the defendant should have not only the right to
the assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing, but also the
right to confrontation and compulsory process.
D. Conclusion
How can the federal courts, whose resources are already
stretched nearly to the breaking point, 4 accommodate those addi-
tional rights? The expansion of rights at the sentencing phase sug-
gested here certainly will require a greater commitment of re-
sources. Indeed, the commitment of these resources is essential to
the completion of the reform of the sentencing process that Con-
gress envisioned by enacting the Sentencing Reform Act. Unrelia-
ble fact finding undermines the premise of the Guidelines system.
But what if no additional resources are forthcoming9 Two alterna-
tives could be implemented without committing more resources at
a time when the Administration is seeking to pare down the fed-
eral budget.
First, the Guidelines could be simplified to require far fewer
findings in each individual case. Simplification is not inconsistent
with sentencing reform. To the contrary, the federal sentencing
process is presently far more complex than are its state counter-
92. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970).
93. Cf. United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1993) (Noonan, J., dis-
senting) (stating that the right to counsel at sentencing-the only adversarial evidentiary
hearing provided m most criminal cases-is of little value if counsel cannot cross-examine
the witnesses against the defendant).
94. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY Comm, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMIrr-
TEE 4-7 (1990) (describing the "crisis" in the federal courts).
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parts, 5 and many critics believe that this complexity is a vice,
rather than a virtue.96 Second, a reduction in the number of federal
criminal cases, bringing the caseload in line with available re-
sources, is not only feasible, but in fact overdue. As a recent blue
ribbon commission demonstrated, the federal criminal caseload has
expanded to include many cases that could and should be brought
in the state courts.9
Unless more resources are made available, streamlining the
Guidelines and/or limiting federal criminal prosecutions are the
only means available to fulfill the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
and complete the reforms envisioned with the passage of the Sen-
tencing Reform Act.
95. Marc Miller, True Grid: Revealing Sentencing Policy, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 587, 589
(1992).
96. See, e.g., id. (proposing a simplified seven-level federal grid that would conform to all
statutory criteria and clarify the policy choices implicit in the Guidelines); Owen S. Walker,
Litigation-Enmeshed Sentencing: How the Guidelines Changed the Practice of Criminal
Law, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 639 (1992) (comparing the State of Washington's sentencing
guidelines with the Federal Guidelines).
97. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 94, at 35-38 (finding that many drug cases
currently being brought in federal court should be brought in state court, and the federal
courts' most pressing problems stem from an unprecedented number of federal narcotics
prosecutions).
[Vol. 35:147
